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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is a Workmen's Compensation case concerning
the interpretation of Utah Code Ann., 1953 Section 35-1-69.

The

major issues to be determined concern the apportionment of
benefits in a situation where an employee has a pre-existing loss
of bodily function disability and then suffers a work related
injury resulting in addition loss of bodily function.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission of Utah has made the legal
determination that Section 35-1-69 of the Utah Code Ann. does not
allow for an apportionment of medical expenses and temporary
total disability compensation between a pre-existing permanent
loss of bodily function and a work related loss of bodily
function.

A Petition for Writ of Review and a Writ of Review

brings this matter before the Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs on appeal respectfully ask the decision of
the Industrial Commission denying apportionment between the
Second Injury Fund and the employer per Section 35-1-69 of the
Utah Code Ann. be reversed by this Court.
FACTS
Anthony Capitano, the applicant before the Industrial
Commission, was employed by Intermountain Smelting Corporation
on June 9, 1976, when he stepped on a board that gave way causing
him to fall approximately eleven feet to the ground.

As a result

t1r. Capitano suffered a crushing injury to his right ankle.
(Record 43 and 158)

As a result of that injury Mr. Capitano received

temporary total compensation benefits from June 9, 1976, to February
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14, 1977, and medical compensation benefits for the care and
treatment of his injury.

(Record 35)

The applicant simultaneously filed a claim pertaining
to an accidental poisoning by lead or antimony or their compound;
suffered while employed at Intermountain Smelting Corporation
which occurred during the first ten days of December, 1975.
Nothing regarding that incident is relevant to this appeal and
therefore, it will not be discussed.

(Record 15 8)

The applicant had previously sustained a gunshot wound
to his left leg or ankle while in the service in Korea and in
connection with this injury he received a 30% disability rating
by the Veterans Administration.

He receives a monthly benefit

of approximately $113 which will continue during the remainder
of his life.

(Record 35, 38, 54, 158)

The Medical Panel

appointed by the Industrial Commission found that the applicant
had sustained a 30% loss of use of his right foot as a result of
the industrial injury of June 9, 1976.

The Panel also found tha:

the applicant had a 30% loss of use of his left foot due to the
war injury.

The Panel stated that the applicant had experienced

increasing symptoms of the left ankle that were definitely relatE
to the injury of his right ankle due to the changes in the weigh:
bearing tendencies as a result of the combined injuries.

The

Medical Panel further found that the combined overall effects
of both of the injuries gave the applicant a total loss of bo~t
function of the whole man of 25'7,.

The !1edical Panel could not

further break down the relationship of the total 25'7, as to whk
ankle had contributed how much to the total loss of bodily
function. (Record 150

151)
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1

With that information the Administrative Law Judge,
as concurred in by the Commission, made a determination in a very
well thought out opinion that using the American Medical Association's
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, an 8 1/2% loss of
the whole man could be attributed to the industrial injury.

Further,

he found that the remaining 16 1/2% loss to the whole man could be
attributed to the preexisting condition.

A finding was also

made that the 16 1/2% was a substantially greater loss than
the applicant would have incurred if he had not had the preexisting injury. The Commission went on to state as a finding
that that circumstance qualifies the applicant for additional
benefits payable out of the Special Fund under the provisions
set forth in Section 35169 Utah Code Ann.

(Record 159

160)

With that assessment, plaintiff on appeal fully concurs.
The error claimed by plaintiff on appeal is the failure
of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
of Utah to accord to the employer and its insurance carrier
the right of having the Second Injury Fund reimburse them
from the Second Injury or Special Fund a proportionate share
of the medical compensation benefits and the temporary total
loss of bodily function benefits.

There is no issue concerning

permanent partial disability benefits.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFFS ON APPEAL ARE ONLY LIABLE FOR THAT PERCENTAGE
OF THE TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL EXPENSES
COMPENSATION AS THE PERCENTAGE OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
FROM THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BEARS TO THE TOTAL PERMANENT PARTIAL
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DISABILITY FROM ALL CAUSES.
This appeal is based upon the law as stated in Section
35-1-69 of the Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.

For the Court',

information and as it may recall there are several consolidated
cases dealing with the same issues as presented in this appeal.
The Court may wish to refer to Supreme Court Nos. 15882, 15881,
and 15796.

Oral argument has been presented in those above three

cases and the Court currently has those matters under considerati:

1

For the convenience of the Court the pertinent parts o'
Section 35-1-69 of the Utah Code Ann. are set out below.
(1) If any employee who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury,
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an
industrial injury for which compensation and
medical care is provided by this title that
results in a permanent incapacity which is
substantially greater than he would have
insurred if he had not had the pre-existing
incapacity, compensation and medical care,
which medical care and other related items
are outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded
on the basis of the combined injuries,
but the liabilit of the em lo er for such
medica

Next, the statute describes the duties of a Medical Fa;,
which is followed by an expression of the duty of the Industrial
Commission:
The Industrial Commission shall then assess
a liability for compensation and medical care to
the employer on the basis of the percentage of
permanent physical impairment attributable to
the industrial injury only, and the remainder
shall be payable out of said Special Fund.
Amounts, if any, which have been paid bt the
em lo er ln excess of the ortion attri utable
to t e sal industrlal injurt, s al
e reimbursed to the employer out o sald Soecial Fund.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

The Commission through its Administrative Law Judge
states that it was not the intent of the legislature to
entitle an injured workman a double recovery for a pre-existing
condition that otherwise would meet the criteria for payment
from the Special Fund.

In the case at bar the injured workman

was receiving disability comepnsation from the Federal Government
for what amounted to an 8 1/2% loss of the whole man, leaving
8 1/2% to be compensated by the employer and his insurance
carrier and yet another 8% uncompensated if not by the Special
Fund.
Arguendo, by Section 35-1-69 the applicant may or may
not be entitled to the total 16 1/2% loss of the whole man
attributable to the service connected injury.

Nonetheless,

even if the employee himself is not entitled to benefits
from the Second Injury Fund, the employer's and its insurance
carrier's "liability . . . for such compensation and medical
care shall be for the industrial injury only
35-1-69, supra.

Section

In other words, even if the employee has

received prior compensation from some other source, the
employer cannot be made to pay any more than the damage actually
caused by the compensible on-the-job injury.

Stated still

another way, it is clear from the wording of Section 35169,
supra, that it is intended not only as a benefit to the
employee, but also as a limitation of the extent of liability
of an employer. As such, the fact of prior compensation from
another source should not be visited upon the employer to
increase his liability.

That would be contrary to the clear policy

that
"the
of Funding
the employer
for bysuch
compensation
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medical care shall be for the industrial injury only
Section 35-1-69, supra.
The apportionment of liability as herein requested
is not without precedent.

The case of Intermountain Health

Care, Inc., v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (1977) is the most recent
interpretation of Section 35-1-69, supra.

Therein, the

applicant suffered from a pre-existing psychological condition
relating to pain in her back.

A back strain at work resulted

in a medical determination that she had a 30% permanent
partial disability with 10 % of that pre-existing and 20% due
to the on-the-job incident.
In reversing the Industrial Co=ission for its failure
to apportion the compensation payable (including permanent
partial disability and temporary total disability) and the
medical expenses, the Court stated the following:
The position of the defendant as reflected
in the Collliilission's order seems to be predicated on the assumption that because the
pre-existing condition was quiescent and did
not require medical treatment until the
accident, the plaintiff employer should be
held responsible for the entire expense thereof.
But it will be noted that the statute makes no
a~stinct~on between the award for

at 562
The Court continues to explain what is meant by a
"permanent incapacity .

substantially greater than if the

pre-existing incapacity had not existed .
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One more time the Industrial Commission, in its
Denial of Motion for Review (R. 171), appears in essence to
be saying that the Court didn't mean what it said in the Ortega
case, supra.

The Commission goes beyond the four squares of

this Court's opinion and facts upon which that opinion is
based and implies that the Court was ill-informed on the
totality of the evidence.

The Commission seems to be attempting

to retry Ortega, supra. , because it does not care for the
clear pronouncement of law contained therein and in Section
35-1-69, supra, because of its concern about its administration
of the Special Fund.
The Commission would further want this Court to limit
the application of the Ortega rule by excluding temporary total
and medical benefits.

Both the Ortega decision and Section

35-l-69 state that compensation and medical care are to be
apportioned.

That "compensation" includes temporary total

and medical benefits is put to rest by the definition of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

"comoensation" Library
in the
itself.
ServicesAct
and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. . The following terms as used in this
title shall be construed as follows:

(6) "Compensation" shall mean the payments
and benefits provided for in this title."
Section 35-1-44(6) UCA, 1953.
In all of this discussion, we should not forget the
basic purpose of Second Injury Funds.

Professor Arthur Larson:

his learned treatise very aptly states the public policy which
dictated the passage of such legislation:

Under either rule, then, the compensation
system operated unsatisfactorily in the case
of previously impaired workers: Under apportionment, they received far less than their
actual condition required to prevent destitution; under nonapportionment they lost their
jobs. Second Injury Funds, which have been
adopted in all but four states, are the
solution to this dilemma. The usual provision
makes the employer ultimately liable only
for the amount of disability attributable
to the particular injury occurring in his
employment, which the Fund pays the difference
between that amount and the total amount to
which the employee is entitled for the combined effects of his prior and present injury.
Larson's Horkman's Com~ensation Law, Vol. 2,
Sect~on 59.31 PP. 10-2 5 to 10-288.
(Emphasis added)
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CONCLUSION
This Appeal is somewhat unique in that the applicant
and his employer and the employer's insurance company are not
adverse parties for the purposes of this Appeal.

All should be

in agreement that the apportionment of Section 35-1-69,
supra, is clearly the way these and similar matters are to
be handled.

The adverse party is the Special Fund as administered

by the Industrial Commission.
In summary, Section 35-1-69, supra, and the Ortega case,
supra, leave but one conclusion as to the liability of the
employer for the injuries suffered by the applicant herein.
The employer should be responsible only for the percentage of
the industrial injury loss of bodily function bears to the total
loss of bodily function percentage from all causes or 8.5% to 25%
or 34% of the compensation benefits for medical and hospital bills
and for the temporary total disability period.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that this case
be reversed and remanded to the Industrial Commission with
proper instructions that the employer and its insurance carrier
be reimbursed 66% of the monies advanced to the applicant for
medical and hospital compensation benefits and temporary total
compensation benefits.
RESPECTFULLY SUMBITTED this-4/___ day of August, 1979.
BLACK & MOORE

LA
orney for State Insurance Fund
Intermountain Smelting Corp.
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